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This paper examines various forms of legal control of decisions taken by the U.N. Or-
gans and the role of the International Court of Justice. Firstly, it outlines the role of the U.N. 
Charter itself and the role of the international law in general. It also discusses the power 
of member states’ consent as the (de)legitimator of the U.N. activity.  It then goes on to 
review the procedures and processes  via which the exercise of the powers  of the U.N. 
organs can be challenged by the International Court of Justice and, in particular, discusses 
whether Security Council resolutions can be subjected to judicial review by the ICJ. Finally, 
the paper indicates prospects for future development towards greater control and limitation 
of powers of the U.N organs.
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1. Introduction
United Nations, brought into life within the environment of the Second World War and 
on the ruins of the League of Nations, has been one of the most influential international 
organizations since its beginnings. And although many try to refute it, it is undoubtedly true 
that it has solved many international crisis and prevented larger catastrophes. In fact, it is 
often submitted that the U.N. Charter and decisions of its organs, especially Security Co-
uncil resolutions, make the constitution of the entire international community. After the Cold 
War period Security Council, free from the deadlock caused by veto power of its permanent 
members, spread its activity and made a significant amount of high-influential and binding 
decisions that even included use of force. Opinions are ambiguous. Some welcome the 
powerful international body that can act effectively and prevent wars and other atrocities 
and thus fulfil its role. Others are worried about a growing power of a body dominated by 
only few states without any control. This essay argues that decisions of the U.N. organs 
are subject to various forms of legal control and that International Court of Justice has a 
limited, but potentially growing power of judicial review of the Security Council acts. Also, 
it discusses justification for legal control of the U.N. organs and possible future outcomes. 
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2. Decisions taken by organs of the United Nations as subjects to legal control
It is often submitted that two categories of illegal acts committed by international or-
ganization exist-ones shared with states, and that is breach of international law, and the 
other specific for international organisations, and those are, for example, acts ultra vires.1 
The distinction between Security Council as a treaty-organ mostly controlled by political 
means and the other U.N. organs always regarded as having a legal dimension2 must be 
acknowledged. But, while acknowledging this important distinction, there is no ground for 
conclusion that Security Council is free to completely disregard the Charter and deny the 
operation under international law.3 However, it must be admitted that it was not anticipated 
and that it would not be politically workable that the Council, when confronted with situa-
tions under Chapter VII, must consider all possible rules of international law before using 
its powers and taking measures.4 But, further the Council is from enforcement activities 
the more consideration must be given to the international law and principles of justice.5 
Security Council is not a legibus solutus and claiming that it operates outside the law would 
surely cause ‘denying the relevance of the law to the governance of world affairs’.6  In a 
present system there are many (de)legitimators of U.N. activities7 and they will be critically 
discussed below.
3. The Charter of the United Nations acting as a limitation of its powers
U.N. Charter is a constitutive document of the United Nations, providing its structure, 
functions, competences and procedures. As such, it is the origin of the organization and the 
limit to its competence at the same time.8 Legality and constitutionality of the activities of 
the UN organs, especially of the Security Council, should mainly be based on interpreting 
the Charter.9  In the past, numerous disputes about powers and activities discussed in UN 
organs or before the ICJ have been argued at the level of interpretation of the Charter.10 
As some rightly point out,11 it does not contain any provision concerning its interpretation 
in general. Every organ is bound to determine its own competences and there is no organ 
authorized to determine it for other organs. Some would call it the ‘decentralized approach 
to Charter interpretation’. Nevertheless, it does not seem that the Charter precludes the 
examination of validity of U.N. political organs12 or that it makes the Charter less binding for 
the U.N. and its organs. 
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One should never forget that U.N. organs are intergovernmental organs deriving the 
powers from the Charter and thus abided by its terms which ‘impose substantive limits on 
its actions’.13 Actually, it is quite disturbing how the Council rarely indicates the Charter pro-
vision on which it has founded its acts.14 Thus, it must be accentuated that the Council may 
not create obligations that have no basis in the Charter and that it does not have a ‘blank-
cheque’ to act.15 In fact, according to the ultra vires doctrine it should keep itself within the 
powers vested to it under the Charter, on which Member States have accorded.16 Charter 
is considered to be the legal foundation of the Council’s authority.17
In that regard, one must think of its provisions which expressly provide legal limitations. 
The most important one is contained in Article 2418 which states that the ‘Security Council 
shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’ and those 
are proclaimed in Articles 1 and 2.19 Although there is certain weight in claims that Articles 1 
and 2 laid down provisions which are too general and vague in its nature and thus inappro-
priate for deriving limitations to the Council’s activities20, the argument cannot be accepted. 
Even the same author in the same article claims that ‘imprecision and vagueness are 
general features of law’ and that ‘constant and renewed attempts to clarify the meaning’ 
should be made.21 For many scholars, obligation to act in accordance with the purposes 
and principles of the Charter is thus regarded as a substantive limitation of the powers of 
the Security Council.22 Above all mentioned, Article 25 of the Charter expressly pronounces 
that decisions of the Security Council which member states agreed to accept and carry out 
should be ‘in accordance with the present Charter’.23
Evidently, the Security Council is not a sovereign organ and its powers are conferred 
on it by the state members and through the Charter,24 however hard it is to identify the 
limits of those powers. And Security Council is ‘after all, a treaty body dependent on treaty 
provisions’.25 Member states did not intend to give it a competence de la competence.26 
Given the present dubious situation regarding judicial review, it is plausible to express a 
wish that the ICJ engages more extensively in the interpretation of the Charter.27 Maybe the 
framework is too weak and the formal amendment would never happen, but it articulates 
certain main criteria and is a solid ground for judging the legality and constitutionality of 
U.N. measures.
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4. Member States consent as legal control 
It is undoubtedly one of the sources of legal control, but it is also possible to go re-
ally far by claiming that the ‘Council’s authority exclusively depends on its acceptance 
by the member states’28 and that acceptance could only flourish if the Council does not 
put itself above the Charter.29 Actually, state consent is considered as ‘only origin of the 
obligations imposed by international legal system’ and the Charter as being built on that 
‘cornerstone’.30 To go even further, it is possible to claim that even the international legal 
order could be subverted if state consent was put aside and the creation of new internatio-
nal law could start.31 Indeed the principle of sovereignty is the ‘cornerstone of international 
law, a consensual legal order’.32 And although there is a bigger distance between state 
consent and their obligations in the acts of the international organization than in the case 
of international treaties and customary international law, state consent should not be rela-
tivized33 and organs should always act within the framework of their competences and not 
regarding the time which passed and its own creativity.34 States are not obliged to comply 
with decisions that are brought ultra vires and they can use all the measures provided by 
the Charter to defend its sovereignty.35 Organs should self-restrain itself because of the 
respect of the principle of sovereignty.36 
To conclude, member states are legitimators of the U.N. activity, ones that should 
always question whether the measure is in accordance with the Charter and thus whether 
it is (un)lawful.37 Some even claim that ‘the ultimate test of the legitimacy of the SC’s action 
remains the level of acceptance of its practice by the UN Member States’.38 This is an argu-
ment that inevitably must be acknowledged by realists also. It is impossible for the U.N. to 
impose sanctions and collective enforcement measures without participation of sovereign 
states which actually bring decisions into reality. U.N. does not have any available means 
such as army, people and equipment to do it by itself. Some argue that the ‘execution and 
effectiveness depend crucially on the goodwill of the members, which depends, in turn, on 
their conviction of the legality of the Council resolutions’.39 In fact, it is even submitted that 
the implementation of the sanctions regime and the obligations laid down in resolutions 
regarding anti-terror measures of the Council has encountered enormous difficulties as a 
result of discrepancy between various domestic enforcement machineries and available 
resources, including occasional lack of political will.40 In any event, states are under obli-
gation to make sure that they do not violate international law.41 It is even considered that it 
would make the implementation process stronger since the anti-terror measures would be 
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perceived as legitimate.42 Overall, state consent is a foundation of international legal order 
which, if attacked, could provide ‘collapse of whole edifice’.43
5. International law and ius cogens
Being an international organization based on constitution created by the agreement of 
member states the U.N. is undoubtedly subject of international law and bound by it.44 To 
that extent, its organs are subject of international law.45 But, while it is possible to disregard 
ordinary norms of international law (ius dispositivum) if that was the intention of the mem-
ber states evidenced in its constituent treaty46, it peremptory norms (ius cogens) cannot 
be disregarded and the states also cannot derogate from that inherent limitation of any 
organization’s powers.47 Not only the peremptory norms are embodied in the U.N. Charter 
and they apply to treaty-based organs through the law of treaties, but they also have a 
direct and autonomous effect on decisions of the organs.48 To put it more precisely, unila-
teral acts or measures or actions of international organisations are bound by peremptory 
norms as the organization itself.49 Arguments that the Council, being classified as a political 
organ, is thus exempt from legal constraints, simply cannot be accepted.50 Violation of ius 
cogens should be regarded as an attempt to establish a new legal regime51 and acts con-
trary to it as ultra vires,52 either by express clauses or by the manner of exercise of rights 
and duties.53 It is certainly unacceptable to use Article 103 as a justification for violation of 
peremptory norms. Article states that Charter obligations prevail over obligations of mem-
bers under other international treaties,54 and those make only a part of international law. 
And even if the Charter obligations prevail over general international law, ‘it would still be 
a treaty provision and hence be unable to prejudice the operation of ius cogens’.55 Under 
general international law regime invalid acts should be considered void ab initio and such 
voidness is itself part of ius cogens.56
 Not less important to discuss are possible means of challenging acts which violate 
peremptory norms. Protest is one of the most obvious. It is not a necessary requirement 
of course, but it may induce Security Council to reconsider its decision. Also, there is the 
refusal to carry out decisions since member states are also bound by ius cogens and 
thus actually obliged to refuse.57 Obligation to carry out Council decisions under Article 
2558 cannot prevail over obligation of the Security Council to bring decisions that are in 
accordance with the Charter and thus with the ius cogens. And, last but not the least is the 
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power of judicial review by the ICJ. Although it is going to be discussed in details below, 
it is important to state that in ‘effects of ius cogens it is not crucial, as it would have only a 
declaratory and not a constitutive effect in this context because absolute invalidity does not 
depend on institutional determinations’.59 Overall, peremptory norms have special role in 
the international legal system and its violation could and should be ‘morally and ethically 
repugnant in the eyes of international community’.60 
There are some serious claims that the Security Council actions under Chapter VII of 
the Charter are not bound by general international law. And while it is possible to accept 
that point of the view since the Council does enjoy a wide discretion and is not required 
to examine the legal position of the parties in the dispute,61 it is not possible to accept it 
regarding ius cogens under any circumstances. There is no weight in the argument that 
the Council is, when dealing with an international crisis, not obliged to examine whether 
one party has been a victim of an illegal use of force and thus legally using force which 
is otherwise forbidden under ius cogens.62 If the Council is confronted with deciding in so 
many complex and hard situations about those crisis where he must determine about such 
vague concepts unknown before such as ‘threat to international peace’, it is not impossible 
to decide about illegality of use of force, especially having in mind there are some clear 
legal guidance on the topic. It is truly inconceivable to imagine Security Council violating 
prohibition of slavery or genocide justified by maintaining international peace and security. 
Interestingly, the same author smartly concludes that ‘there is no contradiction between the 
rule of law and international peace and security’.63 
Human rights law, traditionally regarded as international law, imposes limitations as 
well. It is true that ‘the whole tenor of the Charter is to promote the protection of human 
rights’64 and it would thus ‘be anachronistic if the Security Council was empowered to viola-
te them’.65 Promotion and respect for human rights is one of the Purposes of the UN66 which 
states are bound to accept under the Charter67 and the obligation for its universal respect 
and observance is expressly proclaimed in Article 55 of the Charter.68 But there is always 
a question about specificity, especially whether any human rights norms are peremptory. 
There is no need for discussing the nature of human rights theory, but we must make cer-
tain boundaries. Some rightly pointed out to the International Bill of Rights, given the fact 
that it was created and adopted by the U.N. activity. But clearly not every norm in it is ius 
cogens. So should we claim that it is the rights non-derogable under the treaties that make 
them peremptory? Since ius cogens cannot be made by simple stipulation under one of 
the treaties, we must accept that it is ‘crucial whether a given right is ‘derogable by nature: 
whether it protects the community interest beyond individual state interests’.69 Following 
that approach, we must also reject that rights derogable under treaties could not be ius co-
gens and consequently avoid certain unjust results. Indeed, how could one claim that right 
to fair trial and due process or right to personal liberty are not peremptory, to name just a 
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few.  Question whether that criteria makes all human rights peremptory70 should be left for 
another discussion. Generally, in the area of human rights so-called naming and shaming 
strategy can be very effective,71 being understood as intensive public and media pressure.
There is another legal limit to the Council’s discretionality-principle of proportionality 
and necessity. In fact, those ‘twin requirements’72 have long been determinants of the legi-
timacy of the use of force73 and there is no reason to conclude that they are limited only to 
self-defence.74 They should be regarded as general principles of law that govern all uses of 
force.75 There are undoubtedly derived from the Charter76, but they played a very modest 
role in practice77. Articles 39, 41 and 42, when read together, provide a yardstick for deter-
mining the application of proportionality,78 regarding that Security Council may use force if 
measures taken under Article 4179 would be inadequate or proved to be inadequate80 and 
in order to ‘restore international peace and security’.81 The same articles provide treaty test 
for necessity which is mentioned explicitly.82 Many times, its evaluation depends on political 
considerations without any legal control and with a high margin of appreciation.83 Debate 
about whether principles of international law are legitimate sources of law is too complex 
and broad for this discussion. However, application of these principles to the use of force 
by Security Council is regarded as ‘warranted by elementary considerations of humanity’.84 
After all, states have ‘painstakingly’ developed humanitarian principles and rules of con-
duct in armed conflict and it would be unacceptable to tolerate the Council operating outsi-
de those constraints.85
6. International Court of Justice and power of judicial review 
Judicial review is regarded as probably the most important (de)legitimator of the 
Council’s activities. Question of whether Security Council resolutions can be subjected to 
judicial review by the Court remains of ‘crucial importance to the constitutional system of 
the United Nations’.86 If its aim is to prevent abuse and ensure a proper exercise of power, 
it is one of two fundamental mechanisms for achieving that purpose at national level and 
thus potentially applied to the U.N. system, joint with the separation of powers. 87 Of course, 
power of judicial review has not been expressly given to the Court neither by the Charter 
nor by the Statute of the Court. However, this question could be approached based on 
the meaning of judicial review. Thus, if the judicial review  is understood as ‘a reference 
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to specific means or procedures by which decisions of the U.N. political organs could be 
subjected to the scrutiny of the Court’88 it could be claimed that the power of judicial review 
has not been vested to the Court. But, the Court has been expressly given a competence 
to rule in contentious cases and to give advisory opinions89 and has exercised its power in 
numerous cases. Consequently, it is deemed that it has a significant power of ‘incidental 
judicial review’, especially when judging the legality of the Council’s acts, when those are 
bearing on a case before the Court, however implicit it is.90 However, some argue that it is 
nevertheless a very limited mechanism.91 Of course, the drawbacks are obvious: compe-
tence of the Court depends on the acceptance of the parties, judgment has an inter partes 
effect only, it does not quash the act for all purposes and, finally, it cannot be predicted 
that it will actually tackle the question of validity or legality.92 The same could be said for 
advisory opinions which do not have any binding force at all. But one must consider that it 
must be admitted that judgments of the Court are generally respected and there are small 
chances they would be taken lightly by the U.N. organs and international community.93 If 
the Court really does pronounce that the Council’s resolution is illegal, it would probably 
undermine the legitimacy of the Council decision and mobilise world opinion in support of 
certain cause(s).94 It could serve to the states by giving them courage not to comply with 
the resolution and even lead the Council to reconsider its decision.95 Reaction to the arms 
embargo in Bosnia is a good example of the potential effect.96 
Anyhow, it is more beneficial and less dangerous to judge the legality of the Council’s 
decision by one court in a centralized and orderly system than allowing the process to 
be upheld by every member states for itself97 since it could lead to chaos and a complete 
legal and political uncertainty. It could even give member states an ‘easy excuse for not 
complying with their obligations under the Charter’.98 Actually, judicial review could prevent 
it by legitimizing the Council’s decisions and thus legitimize the constitutional order and 
strengthen international law.99 It could also enhance the effectiveness of the U.N. collective 
security system since its success is mostly based on ‘espousal of ideas and principles’, 
especially of acting under the rule of law, and not on threat of the U.N. use of force.100
One could ask why would judicial review, especially the so-called full-fledged one,101 be 
unwelcome and regarded as inappropriate? It may be true that there is a ‘risk of upsetting 
the delicate balance stuck by the Charter’ and thus endangering the Council’s respon-
sibility to deal with the threats to international peace and security.102 Or that the Council 
members which finally became free from the restraints of Cold War do not want their deci-
sions been blocked again, but this time by the Court?103 Although the Council is probably 
the only body in the international legal order that could prevent a major world conflict and 
88 MARTENCZUK (n 12) 526
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in fact has already successfully dealt with some serious international crisis, nothing can 
justify arbitrariness when human lives are at stake.  And the Council is indeed dealing with 
human lives and basic human rights. The ‘state of emergency argument’ should also not 
be accepted no matter how exceptional and emergent the situation is. Chapter VII powers 
are themselves an exception so it would lead to the creation of ‘exception of an already 
existing exception’.104 
Significant concern could be the ‘anti-majoritarian problem’, manifested  as ‘the (i)le-
gitimacy of unelected judges’, although less obvious105 and clearly more democratic than 
in the U.S. That is because no state is guaranteed a place, each judge has to be from 
different states and judges’ tenure is time-limited.106 Another valid concern is the question 
of the constitution of the U.N. Is the Charter primarily a treaty or a constitutive document 
and could it still, even not being an entire U.N. Constitution, be a ‘viable starting-point for 
the Court’s review of an act by another U.N. organ’?107 Whatever the conclusion, it must not 
be forgotten that it is generally accepted that the international law binds the U.N. organs. 
Even more, peremptory norms are absolutely binding, without any exception.  It is perfectly 
natural and logical that the same could form a solid ground for question arising before the 
ICJ in cases with potential judicial review effects. Anyhow, in current terms, even a more 
limited scope of review, the one which looks only to the text of the Charter and peremptory 
norms of the international law,108 would be satisfactory. 
Judicial role could also potentially serve as a ‘checking function’ of the Council,109 which 
is another controversy about judicial review.  The powers of the main U.N. organs were 
not allocated to them according to the traditional understanding of separation of powers in 
national legal orders110 and the system of checks and balances was not built in or concei-
ved by the drafters of the Charter or emerged in subsequent practice.111 But the doctrine of 
separation of powers could be much easily transposed to the international system if a more 
simple and intuitive approach was adopted: ‘power must not be concentrated in one entity 
and must be subject to some control’.112 That is almost unimaginable without some degree 
of judicial involvement.113 No matter how worried we are about the possible ‘ineffectivene-
ss’ of the Council measure, too much of one power is never welcome because of gross 
potentiality of misuse. Constraint in the form of another power is necessary for democratic 
governance.
Could we accept the argument that decisions of the Council, being ‘inherently politically 
sensitive determinations’, are ‘not suitable for judicial review’114 and that Article 39 deter-
minations are final and non-reviewable?115 It was expressly stated by Judge Jennings116 
in Lockerbie, and also emphasized in Namibia case117 that we cannot accept that point of 
104 BIANCHI (n 6) 891-892
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view. It is submitted that ‘could not be reconciled with the Charter framework and practice118 
and that ‘every dispute brought before the Court is justiciable’.119 Maybe there are no clear 
legal standards or any guidance on the question of what constitutes ‘threat to the peace’ or 
‘breach of the peace’120 but is it not the Court the one which should seek to find the meaning 
of concepts contained in constitutive and legal documents related to cases before it.  Also, 
it must be accentuated that neither the Charter nor its drafting history provide evidence for 
the unlimited discretion of the Council under Article 39 and there was clearly no intention 
of member states to constitute a sort of world government in the form of the Council.121 In 
addition to the argument it must be accepted that there is no rule which could prevent the 
Court from dealing with the same proceedings simultaneously with the Council and the fact 
that Article 12, which expressly prevents the General Assembly from parallel proceedings, 
supports the conclusion that it was not predicted to prevent the Court122 since it would also 
be expressly proclaimed in the Charter.
The judicature of the Court gives some very good reasons to believe that the Court has 
some power of judicial review, however limited and undeveloped. There are three crucial 
cases that could support the view.
Decision in Lockerbie case concerning interim measures brought by Libya against Uni-
ted Kingdom and the United States123 is sometimes regarded as ‘the most important and 
jurisprudentially rich of any handed down by this Court since the end of the Cold War’124 
and as having ‘more said than was absolutely necessary to deny the Libyan request for 
provisional measures’.125 It is even compared to a famous decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Marbury v. Madison. Since a complex analysis is required for comparison, suffice it 
to say that both decisions contain some additional judicial thinking focused on the potential 
of judicial review126 and that both the U.S. Constitution and the U.N. Charter do not con-
tain explicit provision for the role of these courts.127 However, the U.S. Supreme Court did 
become an extremely powerful court with a very developed judicial review role that could 
have clear implications for potential future development of the ICJ. On the other hand, 
some describe the judgment in Lockerbie case as extremely cautious128 and having, as 
a consequence, questions of judicial review of the Council resolutions dealt with only by 
implication or completely open.129 And while the majority opinion avoided confrontation with 
the Council, the dissenting and concurring opinions suggest that the opposite is possible 
in the future.130 Of course, it is completely different to contemplate about topic from the 
European point of view since it is an area where it is highly unusual for courts to practice ju-
dicial review if it is not expressly vested to them by the constitution or other legislative acts. 
Thus the European opinion is more inclined to the view that the Charter actually forbids 
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the judicial review.131 Being that as it is, no one could deny that, especially regarding U.S. 
legal system, judicial review could exist without being expressly provided in constitution or 
legislature.  And the Court and the U.N. as a whole have already creatively interpreted the 
Charter, creating doctrines and powers without an explicit Charter license.132
Also, what could be deemed as more important in searching for a justification of the 
judicial review is not a lack of express power, but a lack of express prohibition from exer-
cising it.133 In fact, in most countries where judicial review is not expressly forbidden it is 
actually exercised and declared so by the judges.134 If it is not exercised it is usually when 
it is expressly forbidden.135 It is perfectly logical since the judge is bound to choose the 
principle which has a higher status when confronted with two conflicting principles of law.136 
If the Court was asked to choose between the Security Council resolution and the Charter 
provision, it is bound to choose the Charter which is a ‘higher law’.137
Some even claim that the Court adopted a rather limited power of judicial review in 1962 
in Certain Expenses case endorsing a standard of a presumption of validity.138 Indeed, the 
Court stated that ‘when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it 
was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the 
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires’.139 That clearly indicates that the Court 
could consider the action of the Organization as ultra vires and possibly might decline to 
give effect to it.140
Another important case is Namibia141. Although being only an advisory opinion, the 
Court considered the validity of the acts of other U.N. organs, which is inconsistent with the 
view that it has no power of review.142 As Judge Onyeama state in his dissenting opinion: ‘I 
do not conceive it as compatible with the judicial function that the Court will proceed to state 
the consequences of acts whose validity is assumed, without itself testing the lawfulness of 
the origin of those acts’.143 Judge de Castro, concurring, even expressed opinion that ‘the 
Court, as a legal organ, cannot co-operate with a resolution which is clearly void, contrary 
to the rules of the Charter, or contrary to the principles of law’.144In fact, in the past the Court 
has been more daring with the teleological interpretation when giving advisory opinions, 
because it felt more free when confronted with an abstract question in a non-binding con-
text.145 Of course it is not implied that the Court would do the same in contentious cases, 
especially giving the fact that the organ’s acts would be challenged without its consent.146 
That is why the decision in Lockerbie is even more important-it clearly shows that the Court 
is ready to exercise the power of judicial review even when it is not implicitly or explicitly 
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soaked by an organ of the U.N.147 Direction points towards a broader acceptance of judicial 
review.148
In conclusion, judgements do not indicate that Security Council operates without any 
legal restraints. 149  On the contrary, it is surely not controlled exclusively by political me-
ans.150 Judicial review could, in fact, ‘signal a greater constitutionality of the international 
system for maintaining peace and security’.151 It does not develop fully immediately after 
arrival, but ‘incrementally, unannounced and, sometimes, unnoticed’.152 
Also, it is perfectly plausible to develop constitutional role of the Court as a court of re-
view when solving advisory and contentious cases and thus develop as the principal legal 
organ of the U.N., but with an equal, not superior status to the other organs.153 The Court’s 
decisions could thus at least be influential by its persuasiveness and expected to be res-
pected.154 In the present international legal order that would be a refreshing change and a 
good start for creating a more democratic and humanitarian international legal system with 
a more appropriate balance, if not separation of powers. 
However, even if we accept that some form of limited judicial review exists in the U.N, 
system, it still does not mean that the doctrine of judicial supremacy exists or could po-
tentially develop. In fact, the decision in Lockerbie case did not endorse it in a way that its 
decision would be binding and final on all states and U.N. organs in the future155 but it does 
not mean that the member states could not create another solution in the future. Is it the 
‘Jeffersonian’ doctrine according to which the decision of the Court must be respected only 
in the case that it solves but not necessarily in the future156 more appropriate? Currently, 
and for the start, surely it is. Potentially, it might ‘begin to resemble the limited judicial su-
premacy’157 because the judgments could be ‘highly persuasive’ and thus eventually ‘seen 
as final’.158 It is the model that fits better with the ‘decentralized system’ of international 
law159 and, more importantly, with the Charter and with the negotiating history.160 Surely, it 
is less likely to provoke controversy among member states of the Council.161 Undoubtedly, 
it is appealing to the developing countries162 since they are gravely unrepresented in the 
Council. 
There is another important remark that has to be made. The Court is not an only insti-
tution within U.N. umbrella that could perform a function of (de)legitimation of the Council’s 
actions. In the future the other UN organs or organizations might act more courageous in 
seeking advisory opinions of what lies within their competence.163 The General Assembly 
challenge of expenditures for the Council’s Tribunal for war crimes in former Yugoslavia 
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is a good example of (de)legitimating by a rival U.N. body.164 The purpose could even be 
achieved by subsidiary organs establish by the Court Council itself, and it already occurred 
within Yugoslav war crimes Tribunal which have attempted to legitimize the Council’s deci-
sion to establish it both by the trial and appellate chambers.165 Although subsidiary bodies 
were surely not created for that purpose, they are surely more impartial and apolitical than 
the Council.166 It is even submitted the indirect challenges are possible through ad hoc or 
other arbitrations , before other institutional fora and even before national courts.167 It could 
even be argued that those are more neutral than the Court.168 In any event, it is true that 
‘if the rule of law depends ultimately on the ICJ and its meagre caseload as “last-resort” 
defender”, it is in trouble’.169
7. Prospects for future development
In a world which is so complex being fragmented and interconnected at the same time 
more than ever, it is hard to foresee anything with high amount of certainty. However, some 
basic premises could be derived. If the Court is to move towards greater power of judicial 
review, it certainly cannot be achieved only by strengthening its role by the Court itself . In-
ternational legal system is dominated by states170 and bigger changes could only be made 
by the states. In the U.N. system, that would require formal amendment of the Charter, but 
the same is hardly to expect in the near future because of the present disbalance of powers 
and interests.  But one change could be expected and would certainly enhance judicial 
review process. Giving locus standi for private individuals to challenge the validity of acts 
, although achieved within EU legal system, is hardly to expect. But a much more realistic 
outcome would be the amendment which would allow member states to challenge to chall-
enge the validity of the acts of UN organs before the Court.171 Majority of the member states 
would agree much easier on the topic because it certainly gives them more powers in inter-
national arena and prevents biggest states of having too much power. It is true that present 
balance of powers within U.N. does not represent any more a real balance of power in the 
contemporary world and sooner or later international community, especially if confronted 
with strengthening of the Security Council, will try to make changes towards greater control 
and limitation of powers of the U.N.
8. Conclusion
Question of legal control of the decisions of U.N. organs and the ICJ role related to Se-
curity Council resolutions is evidently complex and dubious. This essay strongly supports 
the view that, although often implicit and limited in its essence, there are numerous forms 
of legal control with the potential for development. Reality of international relations does 
require fast and effective decision making by a powerful organ, but it also requires certain 
control imposed on it by another power. Legal control cannot and should not be exercised 
as a mere copy of national systems, but it should possess at least some power in order to 







170 WHITE (n 153) 216
171 ibid
122 Legal Control over Decisions Taken by the United Nations Organs and Judicial Review...
law and its basic principles which could endanger human rights and even human rights. 
When the stakes are so high, no power should be uncontrolled no matter how much the 
world sometimes desperately needs it. In present circumstances, any possible change co-
uld come by the ICJ itself if it decides to take the path of the more creative reasoning and 
bold judgements. More importantly, it could come from the consensus of member states 
which should recognize its inevitability and positive impacts it could have for international 
community.
Pravna kontrola odluka koje donose tijela Ujedinjenih naroda i sudska   
kontrola odluka Vijeća sigurnosti
Ovaj rad analizira različite oblike pravne kontrole akata koje donose organi Ujedinjenih 
naroda i ulogu Međunarodnog suda pravde. U prvom dijelu naglašena je uloga Povelje Uje-
dinjenih naroda i međunarodnog prava općenito. Također, u radu je raspravljena i ovlast 
pristanka država članica kao jednog od (de)legitimatora aktivnosti Ujedinjenih naroda. 
Nadalje, obrađuje se i postupak kojim se ovlasti organa Ujedinjenih naroda podvrgavaju 
kontroli Međunarodnog suda pravde te se pogotovo raspravlja o mogućnosti podvrgavanja 
rezolucija Vijeća sigurnosti sudskom nadzoru. Zaključno, u radu se naglašavaju izgledi za 
budući razvoj u smjeru veće kontrole i ograničenja ovlasti organa Ujedinjenih naroda.
Ključne riječi: Ujedinjeni narodi, Međunarodni sud pravde, pravna kontrola, sudski nad-
zor, Vijeće sigurnosti
